Temporality and Spatiality have been extensively addressed in philosophy, and their disturbances have been extensively studied in psychopathology (e.g. Wyllie 2005). Mental health patients: (1) describe pathological experiences of Time and Space (Gallagher and Varela 2003); (2) show disturbed timing (Tysk 1984); (3) experience psychopathological phenomena that could be the cause of changes in temporality and spatiality. These topics will be discussed in the case of mood disorders, in particular euphoric and dysphoric mania episodes. Any phenomenological study in mood disorders (...) is delicate as affective disorders are in themselves phenomenologically diverse, because they have obscure meaning, multitude of criteria and inconsistent reference norms. Also, psychoanalytical, colloquial and cognitive psychologies keep instilling comprehensive and epistemological structures onto both mood and time/space notions. Nevertheless, bridging philosophical phenomenology and epistemology on time and temporality with mood psychopathology and taxonomy constitutes an on-going project. Theories by Heidegger, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty as well as by Minkowsky, Binswanger, Fuchs, Parnas, and Sass could help to describe this relation deepened into many other Twentieth-Century philosophical papers. A similar account of space and spatiality will be brought about. We will reason about the concept that they provide evidence to address current conceptualization of “bipolar” disorder and the hierarchical grouping of dysphoric and euphoria mania. (shrink)

El Foro Global de Bioética en Investigación (GFBR por sus siglas en inglés) se reunió el 3 y 4 de noviembre en Buenos Aires, Argentina, con el objetivo de discutir la ética de la investigación con mujeres embarazadas. El GFBR es una plataforma mundial que congrega a actores clave con el objetivo de promover la investigación realizada de manera ética, fortalecer la ética de la investigación en salud, particularmente en países de ingresos bajos y medios, y promover colaboración entre países (...) del norte y del sur.a Los participantes en el GFBR provenientes de Latinoamérica incluyeron a eticistas, investigadores, miembros de comités de ética y representantes de autoridades sanitarias provenientes de Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panamá, Perú, Nicaragua y la República Dominicana. Una legítima preocupación por la protección de las mujeres embarazadas y sus embriones o fetos ha llevado a la mayoría de los países de la Región de las Américas a limitar la realización de estudios con mujeres embarazadas exclusivamente a aquellos estudios específicos sobre el embarazo, y a requerir la exclusión sistemática de las mujeres embarazadas o de las mujeres que quedan embarazadas en el curso del estudio. Ciertamente, a lo largo de la historia de la ética de la investigación, se ha creído erróneamente que proteger a una población es sinónimo de excluirla de los estudios. Se sabe ahora que proceder así implica exponer a riesgos mucho mayores a la población que se busca proteger. El embarazo implica cambios fisiológicos sustantivos e impacta profundamente la manera como el cuerpo metaboliza los medicamentos. Sin embargo, por evitar hacer investigación con mujeres embarazadas, no se ha producido la evidencia científica necesaria para tomar decisiones sobre tratamientos e intervenciones preventivas con dosis eficaces y seguras para ellas y sus embriones o fetos. A manera de ilustración, en el 2001 había en los Estados Unidos apenas más de una docena de medicamentos aprobados para uso en el embarazo (1) y en el 2011 la Food and Drug Administration (FDA) aprobó por primera vez en 15 años un medicamento para su uso en el embarazo (2). Como consecuencia de no haber producido la evidencia necesaria, se pone en riesgo la salud de las mujeres embarazadas cada vez que se les da atención médica. Las mujeres embarazadas se enferman y las mujeres enfermas se embarazan, y no se sabe si los medicamentos que se les da son eficaces o siquiera seguros para ellas y sus embriones o fetos. (shrink)

A review of Maria Luisa Ardizzone's Reading as the Angels Read: Speculation and Politics in Dante’s Banquet. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016. xii 1 454 pp. $95.

Esta entrevista retoma la experiencia de enseñanza de la profesora María Luisa Roel en función de la producción literaria de España. El objetivo es interiorizar sobre cómo esta se ha transferido en el ámbito de educación universitaria. A partir de la trayectoria de la docente, se brinda un panorama de cómo los estudiantes de la carrera profesional de Literatura acatan el conocimiento y la lectura de autores españoles, como Miguel de Cervantes. De igual forma, se mencionan dos momentos históricos (...) en los que se vería la presencia o la ausencia de esta producción: en la Literatura del Virreinato y la creación literaria contemporánea. (shrink)

Resumen: Este trabajo tiene como principal objetivo el de lograr una comprensión de la la filosofía en cuanto fundamento insoslayable para la teología. Sostiene, en primer lugar, la necesidad de desarrollar una teología más autocosciente en el sentido racional del σὺν λόγω, es decir, desde el programa plenamente actual de la fides quarens intellectum. Defiende, en segundo lugar, que la filosofía solo puede entenderse partiendo de la pretensión que la ha animado desde el comienzo de su andadura: la búsqueda de (...) la verdad de las cosas (veritas rerum). Y para este fin tendrá necesariamente que dotarse de densidad metafísica suficiente y apostar por las tesis de un sano realismo cognoscitivo. Este estudio concluye con una reflexión, en tercer lugar, sobre el uso teológico de la filosofía. La tesis que se defiende es que sin el fundamento filosófico, la fe y la teología pierden lo más nuclear de su misión, la posibilidad misma de presentarse todavía con algún rastro de significatividad para el hombre de hoy. Palabras clave Filosofía, Teología, Universidad, Facultad Eclesiástica, Fe, Razón Summary: This work has as principal objective the achievement of an understanding of philosophy in such as it forms an inescapable foundation for theology. It sustains, in the first place, the need to develop a more self-aware theology in the rational sense of the σὺν λόγω, that is to say, from the fully current program of the fides quarens intellectum. It defends, in the second place, that philosophy can only be understood parting from the pretension that has animated it from its outset: a search for the truth of things (veritas rerum). And to this end, it must necessarily equip itself with the sufficient metaphysical density and wager upon the thesis . (shrink)

The main objective of this work is to achieve an understanding of Husserl's phenomenology as philosophical foundation for theology. It sustains, in the first place, that theology and philosophy do more than converge. It deepens, in second place, in the connection between phenomenology and theology, as well as in the Husserlian conception of God as entelechy and ἐνέργεια. This study concludes with a reflection, in third place, on the possibility of elaborating a theology from the phenomenological inspiration. The thesis that (...) is defended is that phenomenology means for theology, literally, an authentic Herausforderung, that is to say, a provocation that from outside interpellates a discourse, the theological one, that many judged already exhausted and at risk of extinction. In the conclusions are detailed the main contributions that the phenomenology makes to theology. El principal objetivo de este trabajo es lograr una comprensión de la la fenomenología de Husserl como fundamento filosófico para la teología. Sostiene, en primer lugar, la idea de que la teología y la filosofía hacen algo más que converger. Profundiza, en segundo lugar, en la conexión entre fenomenología y teología, así como en la concepción husserliana de Dios como entelequia y ἐνέργεια. Este estudio concluye con una reflexión, en tercer lugar, sobre la posibilidad de elaborar una teología de inspiración fenomenológica. La tesis que se defiende es que la fenomenología supone para la teología, literalmente, una auténtica Herausforderung, es decir, una provocación que desde fuera interpela a un discurso, el teológico, que muchos juzgaban ya agotado y en riesgo de extinción. En las conclusiones se detallan las principales aportaciones que la fenomenología hace a la teología. (shrink)

he present study aims to offer an analysis of the analogical discourse on God from STh. I, q.13 a.3-4. Thomas Aquinas's claim consists, mainly, of presenting a solution to the problem of the foundations that support the theological discourse on God. But before analyzing this question, our author has established the conditions of possibility for the knowledge about God. It is just this specific framework of previous questions the place of the debate on the analogy, which is considered, in addition, (...) as a type of indirect language that points beyond itself. Keywords: Analogy, Proportion, Proportionality, Knowledge, Thomas Aquinas. El presente estudio pretende ofrecer un análisis del discurso analógico sobre Dios a partir de STh. I, q.13, aa.3-4. La intención de Tomás de Aquino consiste, principalmente, en presentar una solución al problema de los fundamentos que asisten al discurso teológico sobre Dios. Pero antes de analizar dicha cuestión, nuestro autor ha establecido las condiciones de posibilidad para un conocimiento sobre el mismo. Es precisamente en este marco concreto de cuestiones previas donde se sitúa el debate sobre la analogía, considerada, además, como un tipo de lenguaje indirecto que apunta más allá de sí mismo. Palabras clave: analogía, proporción, proporcionalidad, conocimiento, Tomás de Aquino. T. (shrink)

Abstract: The present study analyzes the anthropological theory of Étinne Bimbenet. It focuses on his proposal for an “expanded anthropocentrism” that admits the anthropological difference between man and animal. His central thesis affirms that realism is a human invention and also constitutes its basic attitude before reality. El presente estudio analiza la teoría antropológica de Étinne Bimbenet. Se centra en su propuesta de un “antropo- centrismo ampliando” que admite la diferencia antropológica entre el hombre y el animal. Su tesis central (...) afirma que el rea- lismo es una invención humana y constituye también su actitud básica ante la realidad. Palabras clave: Antropocentrismo ampliado, nuevo realismo, fenomenología, Étienne Bimbenet. (shrink)

The translation of the book of Hering comes to take from oblivion this important work, filling another hole in the history of phenomenology. Jean Héring (1890-1960), one of the influential thinkers of the earliest period of the phenomenology, as a member of the Göttingen circle created by Edmund Husserl. He was the first to present and popularize phenomenology in France. of particular signifance is his influence on Emmanuel Levinas, who came to the University of Strasbourg in 1923. There Hering introduced (...) him to phenomenology and then sent him to Husserl in Freiburg. Hering's book "Phénomenologie et Philosophie religieuse. Étude sur la théorie de la Connaissance religieuse" presents a specific phenomenological mode of analysis in the area of religious experience and religious knowledge. In it, Hering represented the viewpoint of the early Husserl's understanding of the tasks and purposes of the phenomenology. (shrink)

El presente estudio tiene por fin contribuir al debate contemporáneo en torno al rol que desempeña la religión en la cultura y sociedad nacidas de la modernidad. Se intenta analizar la estructura misma de la cultura y su relación con la vivencia religiosa. A continuación, se advierte de los peligros que la exclusión de la sociedad de esta última podría suponer; finalmente, intentamos diseñar algunas propuestas para restablecer una convivencia armónica de la religión con la sociedad actual cuya estructura invita (...) al pensamiento religioso a asumir una nueva condición acorde a los tiempos. This study aims to contribute to the contemporary debate about the role that religion in the culture and society born of modernity. We try to analyze the structure of culture and its relationship to religious experience. Then we warn of the dangers that the exclusion of the religion involves; finally, we try to design some proposals to restore harmonious coexistence of religion in the contemporary society whose structure invites the religious thinking to assume a new status according to times. -/- . (shrink)

Una investigación realizada en humanos ha desvelado la existencia de ciertas variantes genéticas en la conformación del gen AVPR1A que se traducirían en una mayor o menor disposición y aptitud hacia la vida en pareja. Eso significa que la actividad de ese gen influiría en la calidad de la vida conyugal y muy probablemente interferiría en la orientación de nuestro mundo afectivo.

Research has revealed that genetic variations in the human gene AVPR1A affect the disposition and aptitude of individuals to live in a relationship. Thus the activity of this gene could influence the quality of marital relationships and very likely our emotional inclinations.

Escribir hoy en día un libro sobre hermenéutica, que tal hermenéutica se refiera a la desarrollada por G. Gadamer en su conocido Verdad y método y que se pretenda añadir algo nuevo a lo mucho escrito sobre el tema parecería, a primera vista, empresa irrealizable. Que ambas pretensiones inspiren la sólida monografía de María G. Navarro —titulada Interpretar y argumentar— constituye empresa audaz y arriesgada, plena de coraje innovador, que provoca admiración, curiosidad e interés. Contra lo que pudiera parecer a (...) primera vista, el libro contiene un alto componente de originalidad y creatividad, debido a la estratagema metodoló-gica de que se sirve la autora. A saber, una hermenéutica in obliquo, estrategia consistente en interpretar a la hermenéutica gadameriana a través del prisma de la lógica de la argumentación. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como finalidad exponer la interpretación del joven Zubiri de la filosofía de Husserl expuesta en su Memoria de Licenciatura (Lovaina) y en su Tesis de Doctorado (Madrid). La comprensión de este primer proyecto filosófico resulta esencial para entender el pensamiento maduro del filósofo español. Al mismo tiempo, nuestro estudio intenta determinar la pertenencia de Zubiri al movimiento fenomenológico. Por último, definimos esta primera filosofía zubiriana como una filosofía de la objetividad pura o dicho de manera más breve; (...) un objetivismo. This paper aims to expose the young Zubiri's interpretation of philosophy of Husserl. Zubiri exhibits this interpretation in his undergraduate Thesis (Leuven) and his PhD Thesis (Madrid). The understanding of this first philosophical project is essential to understand the mature thinking of the Spanish philosopher. At the same time, our study attempts to determine Zubiri's membership in the phenomenological movement. Finally, we define this Zubiri’s early philosophy as a philosophy of pure objectivity or said more briefly; an objectivism. -/- . (shrink)

La cuestión principal que se plantea pretende averigüar si la tecnocracia en nuestra sociedad postsecular es un elemento que contribuye o dificulta el desarrollo integral del hombre del que hablaba Popolurum progressio. Divido mi exposición en tres partes recogiendo los mismos términos que aparecen en el título que la encabeza. Hablaré, en primer lugar, de la tecnocracia o de la cultura tecnológica, es decir, el modo en el que es la técnica es vivida y aplicada en los contextos sociales actuales. (...) Situaré después la cuestión en el marco postsecular de nuestra sociedad intentando profundizar en la relación entre ambas magnitudes, la tecnocracia y la postsecularidad. Concluiré mi reflexión analizando las consecuencias, y las oportunidades también, de un nuevo humanismo en continuidad con la propuesta levinasiana, o sea, orientando mi valoración final hacia posibilidad de un humanismo de otro hombre. The main question that is tackled is to find out whether the technocracy in our postsecular society is contributing to the integral development that Populorum Progressio talked about, or it is making it difficult. The paper is divided into three parts. First of all, it talks about technocracy or technological culture, that is to say the way in which technique is lived and applied in current social contexts. Secondly, the question is placed in the postsecular framework of our society, trying to deepen the relationship between both issues: technocracy and postsecularity. The reflection concludes by analyzing the consequences, and also the opportunities, of a new humanism in continuity with the Levinasian proposal, that is, orienting the final assessment towards the possibility of a humanism of another man. -/- . (shrink)

Es sabido que Levinas pasa por ser uno de los primeros y mejores intérpretes de la obra de Husserl y tampoco nadie duda ya, a estas alturas de la investigación, de la decisiva mediación histórica que significó para la naciente fenomenología francesa la labor pionera de nuestro joven autor. Filósofos como Sartre, Ricoeur o Henry no se podrían entender completamente sin el concurso de la obra más temprana de Levinas. La tesis principal que ha vertebrado mi exposición defiende que una (...) parte considerable de la carrera intelectual de nuestro autor -la desarrollada concretamente en los años anteriores a la Shoah- debe ser comprendida como una meditación de la filosofía de Husserl y lo que es aún más importante, que el original tratamiento que nuestro autor irá otorgando con posterioridad a la misma no supone, de hecho, sino su prolongación más allá, incluso, de los límites precisos que el propio fundador de la fenomenología llegara tal vez a prever para ella. La hipótesis de la que he partido es que nos hallamos ante una influencia que supera la mera referencia instrumental a Husserl para convertirse en una de las claves más determinantes y permanentes en la filosofía de Levinas. La contribución principal de mi tesis consiste en haber mostrado ese carácter peculiar y dinámico con el que Levinas fue asimilando la doctrina fenomenológica al tiempo que comenzaban ya a barruntarse en él muchas de las preocupaciones más acuciantes de su posterior filosofía. -/- . (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza la técnica del fracking como una solución a la problemática que en materia hidrocarburos se había dado en las últimas dos décadas, y los impactos negativos que conlleva para la salud y el ambiente. Se plantea como solución la aplicación del principio de precaución que le permite al Estado actuar ante una situación de riesgo e incertidumbre. La metodología escogida fue de corte analítico-deductivo a partir de la normatividad vigente y de los postulados teóricos de algunos (...) autores que son referentes en la materia. Como resultados se presentan algunas reflexiones que invitan a considerar la aplicación de este principio, hasta tanto no se tengan estudios suficientes que garanticen que esta práctica preservará el ambiente y no afectará la salud humana. (shrink)

Mindset plays a vital role in tackling the barriers to improving the preservice mathematics teachers’ (PMTs) conceptual understanding of problem-solving. As the COVID-19 pandemic has continued to pose a challenge, online learning has been adopted. This led this study to determining the PMTs’ mindset and level of conceptual understanding in problem-solving in an online learning environment utilising Google Classroom and the Khan Academy. A quantitative research design was employed specifically utilising a descriptive, comparative, and correlational design. Forty-five PMTs were chosen (...) through simple random sampling and willingly took part in this study. The data was gathered using validated and reliable questionnaires and problem-solving tests. The data gathered was analysed using descriptive statistics, analysis of variance, and simple linear regression. The results revealed that the college admission test, specifically numerical proficiency, influences a strong mindset and a higher level of conceptual understanding in problem-solving. Additionally, this study shows that mindset predicts the levels of conceptual understanding in problem-solving in an online environment where PMTs with a growth mindset have the potential to solve math problems. The use of Google Classroom and the Khan Academy to aid online instruction is useful in the preparation of PMTs as future mathematics teachers and problem-solvers. Further studies may be conducted to validate these reports and to address the limitations of this study. (shrink)

Readers are awaiting a new encounter with stories united under the common title Why We Are in Need of Tales. Let me remind you that these deep philosophical books were written by Maria daVenza Tillmanns, a professional philosopher dedicated to the study of philosophizing with children, who has gained valuable experience in this field. Maria’s books are inspired by her work with her students at El Toyon Elementary School in National City (California), with whom Maria held philosophy (...) with children classes for three years before COVID-19. With parental permission, the children provided their drawings, which are used as illustrations for the books. I read Why We Are in Need of Tales, Part III with great pleasure. The focus of this book is on making decisions, sometimes very hard decisions. In Part II, the focus is on dreams — hopes and wishes we have for life. This book looks at how we may best decide how to make those hopes and wishes come true. And the answer Huk and Tuk suggest is deceptively easy: by making decisions “with your eyes wide open.” (5, p. ix). The author of this excellent book managed to describe how to make decisions with your eyes wide open through the playful dialogue between Huk and Tuk. The books are written in dialogue so the reader immediately plunges into the context of a lively conversation. Dialogue not only sharpens attention, but also invites the reader to participate in the conversation. In this way, the reader becomes a listener at the same time. (shrink)

El propósito de Levinas coincide con el intento moderno de recuperación de la verdad y del sentido aunque en una dirección y contenidos distintos. Si en Hegel la Aufhebung tendía a la Totalidad y lo Mismo , para Husserl será esencial la apertura de Mundo que tiene lugar ya en la experiencia de conciencia del ego trascendental, mientras que Heidegger, por su parte, primará la pregunta por el Ser. El intento de Levinas, en cambio, no será recomponer la relación entre (...) el yo, por un lado, y el mundo, lo absoluto, las cosas o el ser, por el otro, sino la recuperación de la relación entre yo-y-otro. No es un simple cambio en la dirección o en el contenido del sentido de la reflexión filosófica, sino un intento serio de encontrar una nueva significación, «otra manera que ser» que no termine siendo otro proyecto más de integración y síntesis. Lo que propone Levinas es una auténtica salida para la que traza el itinerario que va del ser al otro, recurriendo sencillamente a la experiencia que cotidianamente se nos impone a cada uno de nosotros con un peso incontestable, a saber: la presencia de las diferencias, de lo asimétrico, en definitiva, la manifestación del otro en tanto que otro. Es esta experiencia heterónoma ordinaria, esta vivencia diaria de la alteridad como dato primordial del fenómeno de la intersubjetividad el ámbito que ha intentado explorar nuestro autor. ¿Acaso es esta responsabilidad así sentida conjugable con una experiencia filosófica universal? ¿La responsabilidad puede llevarse hasta el límite de la substitución por el otro, hasta la de-posición del Yo sin identidad? ¿Qué tipo de relación puede darse con algo absolutamente asimétrico, exterior, previo e irreductible? ¿De dónde viene esa asignación apremiante de responsabilidad que llega hasta arrojarme en la obsesión y el asedio? ¿Cómo puede ser éticamente plausible un mandato tan traumatizante y violento que termina por convertir al sujeto en rehén, sustituido ya por los otros? ¿Es posible conciliar la libertad y la autónoma decisión del sujeto con una consideración de la subjetividad como «heme aquí», absoluta pasividad expuesta a los otros y vulnerabilidad de una piel que se ofrece al ultraje y la herida?. En definitiva: ¿es la subjetividad algo de lo que partimos o a lo que llegamos? (shrink)

Interview with the author of "why We are in Need of Tails." Iguana Books, Toronto, Canada.

Quadruple Helix Collaborations (QHCs) is a cooperation model in which industry, government, academia, and the public interact to innovate. This paper analyses the impact of a training intervention to provide specific knowledge, skills, and attitudes to deal with barriers commonly found in the progress of QHCs. We designed, implemented, and evaluated three training programs in Austrian, Colombian, Danish, and Spanish institutions. We analysed trainees’ (n = 66) and trainers’ (n = 9) perceptions to identify the competencies acquired with the intervention (...) and the approach’s limitations. We used online questionnaires (35 trainees; 9 trainers), semi-structured interviews (10 trainees), and a focus group (6 trainers). Trainees answered positively regarding their self-perception about the impact of the course and highlighted the acquisition of inspiration for their practice (score 4.1 out of 5.0) and knowledge (3.7). In contrast, they perceived that a deeper interaction with other participants (2.7) was challenging. After the courses, 74% of respondents indicated that they know more about how QHCs work in practice, and 86% about collaboration or engagement methods. Moreover, participants plan to be more sensitive towards setting common goals (71%) and power imbalances (63%). Trainers’ perceptions align with those expressed by participants, except that they considered that the interaction amongst participants during the course was higher. Qualitative analysis of interviews with participants and the focus group with trainers provides more detail about the strengths and weaknesses of the intervention. Our study shows that the collaborative design and implementation of training impact the participant’s learning competencies, with potential implications in their medium- to long-term practice. (shrink)

Human nature has always been a foundational issue for philosophy. What does it mean to have a human nature? Is the concept the relic of a bygone age? What is the use of such a concept? What are the epistemic and ontological commitments people make when they use the concept? In What’s Left of Human Nature? Maria Kronfeldner offers a philosophical account of human nature that defends the concept against contemporary criticism. In particular, she takes on challenges related to (...) social misuse of the concept that dehumanizes those regarded as lacking human nature (the dehumanization challenge); the conflict between Darwinian thinking and essentialist concepts of human nature (the Darwinian challenge); and the consensus that evolution, heredity, and ontogenetic development results from nurture and nature. After answering each of these challenges, Kronfeldner presents a revisionist account of human nature that minimizes dehumanization and does not fall back on outdated biological ideas. Her account is post-essentialist because it eliminates the concept of an essence of being human; pluralist in that it argues that there are different things in the world that correspond to three different post-essentialist concepts of human nature; and interactive because it understands nature and nurture as interacting at the developmental, epigenetic, and evolutionary levels. On the basis of this, she introduces a dialectical concept of an ever-changing and “looping” human nature. Finally, noting the essentially contested character of the concept and the ambiguity and redundancy of the terminology, she wonders if we should simply eliminate the term “human nature” altogether. (shrink)

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that for blame to be appropriate the wrongdoer must be blameworthy. However, blameworthiness is not sufficient for appropriate blame. It has been argued that for blame to be appropriate the blamer must have standing to blame. Philosophers writing on the topic have distinguished several considerations that might defeat someone’s standing to blame. This paper examines the underexplored consideration of how personal relationships can influence who has the standing to express blame. We seem to assume that if (...) we do not stand in the right relation to the wrongdoer, it is not our business to blame them. I identify three challenges to this view. First, we do not know what is wrong with meddling (whether it is morally or prudentially wrong). Second, there are cases where we have no close relation to the wrongdoer, but where we seem to have standing nonetheless – murder and other serious moral offences are examples of this. Third, we don’t seem to have a clear conception of what ‘standing’ means, and this makes it hard to see how discussion on standing can help us determine the propriety of blame. This paper defends the notion of standing as a propriety condition on blame in cases of meddling. I argue that personal relationships influence who has the standing to blame through constitution of relationship-specific norms; and that the role these norms play in developing and regulating our relationships can explain why meddlesome blame is morally wrong. (shrink)

Maria Kronfeldner’s Preface and Introduction to the Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization maps the landscape of dehumanization studies. She starts with a brief portrayal of the history of the field. The systematically minded sections that follow guide the reader through the resulting rugged landscape represented in the Handbook’s contributions. Different realizations, levels, forms, and ontological contrasts of dehumanization are distinguished, followed by remarks on the variety of targets of dehumanization. A discussion on valence and emotional aspects is added. Causes, functions, (...) and consequences of dehumanization, and the prospects for reducing or undoing it, are introduced. The systematic overview closes with a discussion of some important theoretical complexities that arise in studying dehumanization. After these systematic sections, the scholarly work on dehumanization gets situated in the broader intellectual landscape of debates about the ‘human’ in the humanities and social sciences. The Introduction ends with some notes on scope, limitations, and intended readership of the Handbook. (shrink)

This paper focuses on negative exemplarity-related emotions (NEREs) and on their educational implications. In this paper, we will first argue for the nonexpendability of negative emotions broadly conceived (section 2) by defending their instrumental and intrinsic role in a good and flourishing life. In section 3, we will make the claim more specific by focusing on the narrower domain of NEREs and argue for their moral and educational significance by evaluating whether they fit the arguments provided in the previous section. (...) In section 4, we will propose three educational strategies to foster NEREs’ positive moral role. In conclusion, we will point out that an exemplarist approach to character education would greatly benefit from a more fine-grained account of the emotions involved in the educational process and from a broader perspective on which of these emotions should be taken as valuable for educational purposes. (shrink)

In this Chapter, Maria Kronfeldner discusses whether psychological essentialism is a necessary part of dehumanization. This involves different elements of essentialism, and a narrow and a broad way of conceptualizing psychological essentialism, the first akin to natural kind thinking, the second based on entitativity. She first presents authors that have connected essentialism with dehumanization. She then introduces the error theory of psychological essentialism regarding the category of the human, and distinguishes different elements of psychological essentialism. On that basis, Kronfeldner (...) connects historical, socio-psychological, and philosophical insights in order to show that although essentialism can act as a catalyst for dehumanization, it is not necessary for it. Examples relate to dehumanization in the context of colonialism and evolutionary thinking, to the history of dehumanizing women from Aristotle to 19th-century craniology, and to contemporary self-dehumanization and ‘lesser mind’ attribution. (shrink)

In English, discourse reference to time involves grammatical tenses interpreted as temporal anaphors. Recently, it has been argued that conditionals involve modal discourse anaphora expressed by a parallel grammatical system of anaphoric modals. Based on evidence from Kalaallisut, this paper argues that temporal and modal anaphora can be just as precise in a language that does not have either grammatical category. Instead, temporal anaphora directly targets eventualities of verbs, without mediating tenses, while modal anaphora involves anaphoric moods and/or attitudinal verbs.

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

The Eskimo language Kalaallisut (alias West Greenlandic) has traditionally been described as having a rich tense system, with three future tenses (Kleinschmidt 1851, Bergsland 1955, Fortescue 1984) and possibly four past tenses (Fortescue 1984). Recently however, Shaer (2003) has challenged these traditional claims, arguing that Kalaallisut is in fact tenseless.

Once upon a time, Aesop says, there was a donkey who wanted to be a pet dog. The pet dog was given many treats by the master and the household servants, and the donkey was envious of him. Hence, the donkey began emulating the pet dog. What happened next? The story ends up with the donkey beaten senseless, chased off to the stables, exhausted and barely alive. Who is to blame for the poor donkey’s unfortunate fate? Well, there could be (...) disagreement upon this, but we think emulation is to blame. And it’s on the kinds of envy-related emulation that we focus in this chapter. More analytically, we aim at vindicating the role of envy for moral exemplars within an exemplarist character educational framework. In the first section, we recall the central tenets of an exemplarist account of moral progress, and highlight how negative emotions, in general, have suffered a bad press within character education, with exemplarism being no exception. Then we provide a brief outline of standard strategies of defending envy by appealing to useful taxonomies of envy (e.g., Taylor 1988; Protasi 2016; Fussi 2018). After that, we put forward our 'Donkey Objection' by recalling Aesop’s fable on "foolish imitation", so as to show that when envy triggers mere emulation, it can bear devastating effects such as conformism and a lack of self-worth and personal integrity. In response to this objection, we bring into play a distinction between two rival forms of imitation—emulation and inspiration—and we coin the label of "inspired envy" for those forms of imitation by inspiration triggered by envy that lead to self-improvement avoiding morally detrimental consequences. (shrink)

Partee (1973) noted anaphoric parallels between English tenses and pronouns. Since then these parallels have been analyzed in terms of type-neutral principles of discourse anaphora. Recently, Stone (1997) extended the anaphoric parallel to English modals. In this paper I extend the story to languages of other types. This evidence also shows that centering parallels are even more detailed than previously recognized. Based on this evidence, I propose a semantic representation language (Logic of Change with Centered Worlds), in which the observed (...) parallels can be formally analyzed. (shrink)

This paper introduces a framework for direct surface composition by online update. The surface string is interpreted as is, with each morpheme in turn updating the input state of information and attention. A formal representation language, Logic of Centering, is defined and some crosslinguistic constraints on lexical meanings and compositional operations are formulated.

Rooth & Partee (1982) and Rooth (1985) have shown that the English-specific rule-by-rule system of PTQ can be factored out into function application plus two transformations for resolving type mismatch (type lifting and variable binding). Building on these insights, this article proposes a universal system for type-driven translation, by adding two more innovations: local type determination for gaps (generalizing Montague 1973) and a set of semantic filters (extending Cooper 1983). This system, dubbed Cross-Linguistic Semantics (XLS), is shown to account for (...) various phenomena — including scope relations in English and Greenlandic Eskimo, internally headed relative clauses in Lakhota, serial verbs in Yoruba and VP ellipsis in English. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

This paper argues that the so-called ‘paradox’ of dehumanization is a mirage arising from misplaced abstraction. The alleged ‘paradox’ is taken as a challenge that arises from a skeptical stance. After reviewing the history of that skeptical stance, it is reconstructed as an argument with two premises. With the help of an epistemologically structured but pluralistic frame it is then shown how the two premises of the Skeptic’s argument can both be debunked. As part of that it emerges that there (...) are a couple of ways how dehumanization can be realized, and one such realization can be sufficient for affirming the reality of dehumanization for a specific case. (shrink)

This paper advances the view that the history of philosophy is both a kind of history and a kind of philosophy. Through a discussion of some examples from epistemology, metaphysics, and the historiography of philosophy, it explores the benefit to philosophy of a deep and broad engagement with its history. It comes to the conclusion that doing history of philosophy is a way to think outside the box of the current philosophical orthodoxies. Somewhat paradoxically, far from imprisoning its students in (...) outdated and crystallized views, the history of philosophy trains the mind to think differently and alternatively about the fundamental problems of philosophy. It keeps us alert to the fact that latest is not always best, and that a genuinely new perspective often means embracing and developing an old insight. The upshot is that the study of the history of philosophy has an innovative and subversive potential, and that philosophy has a great deal to gain from a long, broad, and deep conversation with its history. (shrink)

It has long been recognized that temporal anaphora in French and English depends on the aspectual distinction between events and states. For example, temporal location as well as temporal update depends on the aspectual type. This paper presents a general theory of aspect-based temporal anaphora, which extends from languages with grammatical tenses (like French and English) to tenseless languages (e.g. Kalaallisut). This theory also extends to additional aspect-dependent phenomena and to non-atomic aspectual types, processes and habits, which license anaphora to (...) proper atomic parts (cf. nominal pluralities and kinds). (shrink)

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

Data involving epistemic modals suggest that some classically valid argument forms, such as _reductio_, are invalid in natural language reasoning as they lead to modal collapses. We adduce further data showing that the classical argument forms governing the existential quantifier are similarly defective, as they lead to a _de re–de dicto_ collapse. We observe a similar problem for disjunction. But if the classical argument forms for negation, disjunction and existential quantification are invalid, what are the correct forms that govern the (...) use of these items? Our diagnosis is that epistemic modals interfere with hypothetical reasoning. We present a modal first-order logic and model theory that characterizes hypothetical reasoning with epistemic modals in a principled manner. One upshot is a sound and complete natural deduction system for reasoning with epistemic modals in first-order logic. (shrink)

Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that creative hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian ‘blind’ variation have been put forward. This paper offers a new and systematic route through this long-lasting debate. It distinguishes between undirected, random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread confusions regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and creative hypothesis formation. The paper then introduces and develops the standard critique that creative hypothesis formation is guided (...) rather than blind, integrating developments from contemporary research on creativity. On that basis, I discuss three compatibility arguments that have been used to answer the critique. These arguments do not deny guided variation but insist that an important analogy exists nonetheless. These compatibility arguments all fail, even though they do so for different reasons: trivialisation, conceptual confusion, and lack of evidence respectively. Revisiting the debate in this manner not only allows us to see where exactly a ‘Darwinian’ account of creative hypothesis formation goes wrong, but also to see that the debate is not about factual issues, but about the interpretation of these factual issues in Darwinian terms. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics, primary matter is not a positive constituent which must be added to the form in order to have a substance. Primary matter is merely a way to express the negation of some further perfection. It does not have a positive ontological status and merely indicates the limitation or imperfection of a substance. To be sure, Leibniz is less than explicit on this point, and in many texts he writes as if (...) primary matter were a positive constituent of a substance. It seems to me, however, that the view most in keeping with the thrust of his mature philosophical system is that captured by a striking remark of 1695: “Materia rerum est nihilum: id est limitatio [The matter of things is nothing: that is, limitation].” This becomes especially apparent in texts showing that Leibniz’s conception of primary matter corresponds to his conception of creaturely limitation. I start by discussing the notion of primary matter in the scholastic tradition. I then show that although Leibniz places the scholastic terminology of primary matter at a crucial juncture of his metaphysics, he thinks of primary matter in a way which significantly deviates from earlier scholastic views. I conclude that despite his adoption of distinctive terminology of Aristotelian scholasticism, instead of holding a broadly Aristotelian concept of primary matter as the ultimate subject of inherence, Leibniz thinks of primary matter according to a Neoplatonic blue-print in which matter is non-being, privation, mere absence of perfection. (shrink)

No two individuals with the autism diagnosis are ever the same—yet many practitioners and parents can recognize signs of ASD very rapidly with the naked eye. What, then, is this phenotype of autism that shows itself across such distinct clinical presentations and heterogeneous developments? The “signs” seem notoriously slippery and resistant to the behavioral threshold categories that make up current assessment tools. Part of the problem is that cognitive and behavioral “abilities” typically are theorized as high-level disembodied and modular functions—that (...) are assessed discretely (impaired, normal, enhanced) to define a spectral syndrome. Even as biology reminds us that organic developing bodies are not made up of independent switches, we remain often seduced by the simplicity of mechanistic and cognitive models. Developmental disorders such as autism have accordingly been theorized as due to different modular dysfunctions—typically of cortical origin, i.e., failures of “theory of mind” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), of the “mirror neuron system” (Ramachandran and Oberman, 2006), of “weak central coherence” (Happe and Frith, 2006) or of the balance of “empathizing” and “systemizing” (Baron-Cohen, 2009), just to list a few. -/- The broad array of autonomic (Ming et al., 2005; Cheshire, 2012) and sensorimotor (Damasio and Maurer, 1978; Maurer and Damasio, 1982; Donnellan and Leary, 1995; Leary and Hill, 1996; Donnellan and Leary, 2012; Donnellan et al., 2012) differences experienced and reported by people with autism have by such theories typically been sidelined as “co-morbidities,” possibly sharing genetic causes, but rendered as incidental and decisively behaviorally irrelevant symptoms—surely disconnected from cognition. But what if the development of cortically based mental processes and autonomous control relies on the complexities and proper function of the peripheral nervous systems? Through such an “embodied” lens the heterogeneous symptoms of autism invites new interpretations. We propose here that many behavioral-level findings can be re-defined as downstream effects of how developing nervous systems attempt to cope and adapt to the challenges of having various noisy, unpredictable, and unreliable peripheral inputs. (shrink)